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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Theories of social comparison have a long presence in the social sciences 
and have provided many useful insights. In economics, the idea of 
comparison, aspiration or relative income belongs to this theoretical 
framework. The first systematic usages of this idea can be found in the works 
of Keynes and Duesenberry. After these works the concept was relatively 
ignored by orthodox theorists until its recent re-appearance  mainly in the 
fields of labour and macroeconomics. To the contrary, however, income 
comparisons continued to play a role in much of Keynesian inspired and  
Behavioural economics literature. In the last few years it has made a strong 
comeback in the literature of job satisfaction and of the economics of 
happiness. This paper attempts to trace the development of the concept in the 
modern history of economic thought. It also discusses the  main theoretical 
implications of adopting income comparisons and  possible reasons for its 
relative disregard by orthodox  economics.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The idea of comparing rewards with others  has a long and persistent 
presence in social sciences. Its importance in explaining social phenomena  
has been recognized by many  and this is the basic reason why it can be 
found in many psychological, social and managerial theories. Examples of 
theories where the idea of comparing rewards is central are: social 
comparison theory, reference group theory, relative deprivation theory, 
adaptation level theory, dissonance theory and equity theory (see for 
instance Festinger, 1954; Adams, 1963; Martin 1981; Greenberg,1990; Deci 
and Ryan, 2000) and for surveys see Kapteyn and Wansbeek 1982, and 
Earl, 1990). As was mentioned, these social comparisons theories have  
provided numerous insights in many research fields. In the specific form of 
the comparison wage or income, it can also be found  in numerous social 
study fields and especially in the context of equity theory and motivation 
theory (see Homans,1961; Valenzi and Andrews, 1971; Sweeny, 1990; 
Levine, 1993; Ambrose and Kulik, 1999; Deci and Ryan, 2000).   
In  economics, the concept of comparison income or wage belongs to 
this general theoretical framework.1 One of the first systematic uses of the 
idea of comparison (relative) wage with important analytic consequences 
can be found in Keynes (1936 [1973], pp.13-14). The next notable extension 
of the concept was the relative consumption hypothesis based on the notion 
of relative income and consumption in Duesenberry’s  (1949) book. 
                                                 
1
 Recently, economists by using the idea of  comparison income have attempted to provide a 
choice-theoretic justification for the kinds of behavioural rules predicted by social 
psychologists (such as in Adams' equity theory and Homans' social exchange theory). See for 
instance Clark and Oswald 1998. 
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However, in spite of its increasing popularity in other social fields, it was 
relatively ignored by mainstream economists. Until recently, most 
mainstream economists were convinced  that  individual utility depends on 
absolute income alone. As L. Summers points out: 
 
Keynes’ emphasis on relative wages has not been reflected in most 
contemporary discussions (Summers, 1988, p.383) 
 
The concept though  continued to play a role in many non-orthodox 
approaches like Post-Keynesian and Behavioural economics where  the idea 
has been used in a variety of theoretical settings.  It was also employed in 
sporadic works which were then considered to be in the fringe of economics 
research. The best example here was the  work of  Easterlin  who  
formulated the  hypothesis that  well-being depends on relative income, not 
absolute income (Easterlin, 1974 and also Easterlin, 2001).  
However, in the last two decades, its fruitfulness has  started to be  
realized by an increasing number of economists and thus it has started to re-
enter mainstream economic literature. The  subfields of macro and labour 
economics are indicative examples. In particular, the idea that unions and 
workers compare income or wages with others has been expressed in a 
plethora of terms such as relative wage, fair wage,  aspiration wage, 
comparison or target wage2.  [see for instance, Oswald (1979, 1986), Frank 
(1984), Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984, 1986), Summers (1988),  Lommerud 
(1989), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Clark and Oswald (1996), Drakopoulos 
                                                 
2
 Many authors use the above terms interchangeably. However, in some  formal 
specifications y is income, y* is called reference group or comparison income, while the ratio 
y/y* is called relative income. The same apply to the more specific term of wage (see also 
Clark, Frijters and Shields, 2007). 
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and Theodossiou (1997), Charness and Grosskopf (2001)]. It has gained  
analytical strength  with empirical studies indicating that wage settlements in 
key sectors of the economy determine settlements in other sectors (e.g. 
Jacoby and Mitchell,1990).  
In the last two decades the notion of comparison income has also 
entered the job satisfaction literature and more recently the quite fashionable 
subfield of happiness research mainly in formulations examining the 
relationship between income and happiness (e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1996, 
Frey and Stutzer, 2002a; Drakopoulos, forthcoming).  
The review of the literature on the adoption of  the notion of relative 
income indicates some important consequences for widely accepted 
economic results. Apart from the Keynesian-inspired notions of  wage rigidity 
and unemployment  equilibrium,  its usage might entail serious rethinking 
concerning economic growth, income inequality and taxation theories. This 
might help explain its relative neglect for many years by mainstream 
theorists. In this paper we will start with a discussion of the   introduction of 
the idea of comparing rewards in  Keynes and Duesenberry and also its 
presence in the works of some Post-Keynesian and Behavioral theorists.  
The third part will investigate its re-introduction mainly in the field of 
macroeconomic theory and in labour  economics. In the following part of the 
paper, we will examine its current usage in the subfields of job satisfaction 
and of the economics of happiness. The fifth part will discuss the main 
implications for standard economic results of incorporating comparisons. A 
concluding section will close the paper.  
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II. Keynes, Duesenberry and Non-mainstream Schools 
 
The idea of comparing rewards is present in the works of a number of 
economists in the history of economic thought. For instance, the notion of 
conspicuous consumption first proposed by Veblen (1899), rests on the 
assumption that individuals compare rewards. However, the first systematic 
use the concept with its  analytical consequences  can be found in the work 
of Keynes. In the “General Theory”, Keynes writes:  
“… any individual or group of individuals, who consent to a reduction of 
money-wages relatively to others, will suffer a relative reduction in real 
wages, which is a sufficient justification for them to resist it. On the other 
hand it would be impracticable to resist every reduction of real wages, due  
to a change in the purchasing-power of money which affects all workers 
alike” (Keynes 1936, p.14) 
 
 It  is well known that in his “General Theory”,  Keynes paid a lot of 
attention to wage relativities as an integral part of his underemployment 
equilibrium analysis. He pointed out that the main  reason why workers resist 
a cut in money wages is to maintain their relative position in the wage 
structure and not so much  to avoid a cut in their absolute income  Thus the 
reference wage can be linked to the average wage settlement in the industry 
or to the previous year  wage rate (Keynes, 1936, pp.13-14, see also 
Trevithick,1976).  
James Duesenberry’s work on income and consumption was the next 
major analytical use of the concept of reward comparisons in economic 
theory. In particular, Duesenberry is known as the proponent of relative 
consumption hypothesis, the basic idea of which was that ”Any particular  
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consumer will be influenced by consumption of people with whom he has 
social contacts” (Duesenberry, 1949, p. 48). Duesenberry proceeded further 
to analyse the basis of such behaviour. As he writes: 
 
We can maintain then that the frequency and strength of impulses to increase 
expenditure depends on frequency of contact with goods superior to those 
habitually consumed. This effect need not depend at all on considerations of 
emulation or “conspicuous consumption” (Duesenberry 1949: 27-28). 
 
 In order to provide  further foundations of this notion, he  suggested self 
observation to experience the relative deprivation of the demonstration effect: 
 
The best way to demonstrate that consumption expenditures can be forced up 
by contact with superior consumption goods is to ask the reader to consult his 
own experience. What kind of reaction is produced by looking at a friend’s 
new car or looking at houses or apartments better than one’s own? The 
response is likely to be a feeling of dissatisfaction with one’s own house or 
car. If this feeling is produced often enough it will lead to action which 
eliminates it, that is, to increase expenditure (Duesenberry 1949: 27). 
 
Duesenberry’s approach was directly connected with Keynesian 
views and attempted to explain a number of important issues like  the 
pattern of savings and growth. Following Duesenberry, savings rates depend  
on the position of income distribution and not exclusively on the income 
level, as in a traditional savings function. However, it never gained popularity 
among mainstream theorists also because “it fell victim to its own analytic 
gaps and to competition from allegedly simpler explanations offered by 
Modigliani and Brumberg  and Friedman” (Harbaugh, 1996). In spite of this, 
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the notion of relative consumption found early followers within psychology as 
in the work of Runciman (1966) 
The theme of  wage relativity is thus very important in Keynes and the 
subsequent Keynesian inspired literature (see for instance, the papers in 
Rotheim, 1998). In particular, some Keynesian oriented economists have 
employed it recently in wage setting and business cycle models (e.g. Arestis 
and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal 1998; Danthime and Kurmann, 2004).  
Apart from the Keynesian oriented economists, the idea of comparing 
rewards was also present in the behavioural economics literature. One of the 
basic premises of behavioural economics which grew in the post war 
decades, was the social and psychological dimension of economic behaviour. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the idea of social comparisons and comparing 
rewards was an integral part of most behavioural economic analysis (see also 
Earl, 1988). One of the first authors  to challenge the established  mainstream 
assumptions about individual economic behaviour was Harvey Leibenstein. 
Although he is basically known for his work in the theory of the firm, 
Leibenstein’s theory of consumer behaviour has been less popular. In the 
same conceptual framework as Duesenberry,  Leibenstein, suggests that an 
individual’s preferences are positively affected by the preferences of other 
individuals for a particular product. This interdependence of individual 
preference functions, is called  the ‘bandwagon effect.’ (Leibenstein, 1950, 
1976). Furthermore, the notions of social status and relative income are 
central in his microeconomic approach. As he  points out:  
The household’s view of status depends on a reference group of ‘important 
others’ who influence the consumption decisions of the household. The utility 
of such expenditures are in part a reflection of expectations of explicit or 
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implicit approval or disapproval of the important others. We live in social 
groups. Beyond basic sustenance, consumption has a broad social status (life 
style) basis (Leibenstein1975: 5). 
 
In particular, the concept  of social status  refers to a household’s relative 
position in the hierarchy of social status groups or the class structure of 
society and the concept of relative income refers to the income of a household 
relative to the average income within a given social status group. These ideas 
played an important role in much of Leibenstein’s analysis including that of  
fertility decline (see also Albanese, 1988). 
J. Baxter is a representative example of the emphasis that many 
contemporary behavioural economists put on the concept of reward 
comparison. In his work, Baxter argues that social comparison processes play 
an important role in forming individual preferences (Baxter, 1988, 1993). 
Furthermore he makes a distinction between needs and wants and favours a 
hierarchical ordering of irreducible needs. All these  imply that  standard 
economic analysis based on utility and indifference curves is seriously limited. 
Baxter employs interdependent utility functions which are applied to labour 
market analysis. As he claims, the notion of  social comparisons and 
hierarchical needs could account for the Keynesian idea of downward wage 
inflexibility (Baxter, 1988).   
The combination of the comparison income and hierarchical needs 
structure has been used by other authors in order to  show non-market 
clearing effects. For instance,  in a dynamic setting the definition of basic or 
lower order needs alters in the sense that what was deemed a luxury a few 
years ago becomes a necessity today (Kaufman, 1999 and Berry, 1994). 
Thus there will be unsatisfied needs and this is equivalent to the difference 
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between reference income and actual income (see also Drakopoulos, 1992 
and Altman, 2001). 
 
III. Macro and Labour Economics  
 
 
As was mentioned in the beginning, the concept of comparison 
income or wage was relatively ignored by mainstream economists for many 
years after Keynes brought it on the surface. However, there were some 
early empirical findings which suggested that  wage considerations in one 
industry might affect wage settlements in similar industries. More specifically, 
there were indications that  for many years "key groups" industries in US 
manufacturing determine to a large extent wage changes in "non-key 
Groups" industries (Eckstein and Wilson,1962; Hamermesh (1975); 
Flanagan 1976). Furthermore, in countries like Sweden, wage changes in 
the non-manufacturing sector were found to be influenced by changes in the 
manufacturing sector  and that outside or reference wages  are quite 
important for wage setting at the local level  (Jakobsson and Lindbeck, 
1971;.  
In the late 1970’s and 1980’s the notion started to appear in a few 
theoretical macroeconomics papers. In one of the early papers, Boskin and 
Sheshinski, (1978) assume that the welfare of individuals depends in part on 
relative after-tax consumption. This implies that  “an additional incentive for 
income redistribution from wealthy to poor citizens is created” (Boskin and 
Sheshinski, p.590, 1978). In the same spirit, Kapteyn and Van Herwaarden, 
(1980), adopt interdependent individual welfare functions in order to study 
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their  implications for income distribution. The authors show that  a neglect 
for interdependence leads to incorrectly weighing  economic growth against 
income redistribution. 
A few years later, Akerlof’s idea of adherence to social custom which 
implies that the agents’ utility is influenced by other agents’ utility, is another 
early example of comparing rewards. Akerlof presents the fair wage 
hypothesis as the main example of such a social custom. He proceeds to 
show that this might help explain involuntary unemployment  (Akerlof, 1980). 
The concept of comparing rewards is also embodied in Oswald’s notions of 
jealousy and altruism. In particular, Oswald shows that if agents exhibit such 
behaviour, the optimal tax theory’s general results either no longer hold or 
need not hold (Oswald, 1983). Another  early example was the work  of 
Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984, 1986) who employ the idea that unions wage 
decisions are interdependent, in the sense that a  union aspires to an 
appropriate wage by taking into account the rest of the industry's wage or 
the average national wage. The analysis is used in order to investigate the 
relationship between inflation and unemployment in the short and long run. 
In the same spirit, the work of Frank (1984) employed the assumption that 
workers care about  relative income in a framework of competitive wage 
determination  in order to study the relationship between the equilibrium 
distribution of wages and marginal products.  
A few years later,  Summers (1988) focused on the idea of relative 
wage and attempted to integrate it in the modern understanding of  
unemployment equilibrium. Summers acknowledges Keynes emphasis on 
the concept and the fact that it has been  largely disregarded by 
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contemporary macroeconomic theory. Thus as can be seen, the use of the 
notion of comparing rewards was regaining popularity in mainstream 
macroeconomics. Most of the above representative works indicated that the 
incorporation of the concept has other important macroeconomic 
implications apart from the traditional explanation for downward wage rigidity 
and involuntary unemployment. Namely, its incorporation in macroeconomic 
formulations has important consequences for income distribution, growth  
and tax policy.  
In the field of labour economics, the idea that trade unions  care about 
relative wages had been suggested as early as 1948. More specifically, one 
of the earliest labour economists, A. Ross,  argued that unions are not so 
much concerned with the maximum possible wage increase, as with relative 
as opposed to absolute wages (Ross, 1948). However, the idea was 
dormant until the early eighties when the lead taken by the gradual 
reintroduction of the idea of comparison income in macroeconomics was 
followed by a number of labour economists.  Its promotion  was also assisted 
by the above mentioned empirical indications of union wage 
interdependence. 
In the 1980’ and early 1990’s there were further empirical indications 
of the importance of relative considerations at both the individual and at the 
aggregate level. For instance an early paper by Van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and 
Van de Geer, (1985) using panel data found empirical evidence for relative 
considerations on the individual level. Similarly, Clark and Oswald (1996) 
found that workers care about comparison wage rates. At the aggregate 
level, there were also a number of empirical papers which seem to support 
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the idea of interdependent wage decisions among industries in US and in 
many European countries (see for instance, Holmlund and Skedinger, 1990; 
Jacoby and Mitchell, 1990; Flanagan, Moene and Wallerstein, 1993; de la 
Croix, 1993,1994) 
The empirical phenomenon of wage interdependence could not easily 
be explained by the conventional approaches to union objectives. Many 
authors  ascribed it to union preferences and other factors without specifying 
how those preferences can be the source of such behaviour (see for instance, 
Hochman and Rogers, 1969). However, the above findings combined with 
empirical results at the individual worker level, can easily be explained by 
employing the idea of comparison wages: unions and workers do not care 
only about their own wages but also about other unions wage settlements. 
This implies that the inclusion of own wages only in the union objective 
function might be seriously incomplete. On the contrary there were a number 
of  theoretical reasons which can justify the importance of a comparison or 
reference wage in union utility (see Pencavel, 1991; Clark and  Oswald,1996 
and Frank,1997).  
The first step was the attempt to integrate such preferences in the 
objective function of the union. Thus, in an influential paper on union 
literature, Oswald (1979) starts with the stylized fact the unions seem to follow 
each other’s wage demands. He then proceeds to construct a model of an 
economy with many trade unions with wage interdependence as a basic 
characteristic. A few years later,  the same author,  Oswald (1986) explicitly 
draws on the idea of relative wage in a trade union utility function as a 
possible explanation of wage rigidity (1986). Oswald utilizes some work in 
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psychology to suggest two ideas: a) that there is an asymmetry between 
responses to "over-pay' and "under pay" and b) that there is an aspiration 
wage which is the level of pay which is seen as the fair amount or the norm, 
and which depends on past achievements or comparisons with the wage of 
other workers. Once this aspiration wage has been achieved, extra increases 
of wages provide less utility. J. King’s  (1990) work is along these lines. 
Similarly, the fair wage hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen (1990) can also be 
placed in the same framework. Thus,  by the early 90’s although the idea of 
relative concerns was not considered a standard specification in the union 
utility function, it had started to be taken more seriously by some labour 
economists. 
 
IV. Job Satisfaction and  Happiness 
 
For many decades, job satisfaction research was thought to be the 
concern of industrial and occupational psychology specialists. Economists 
were reluctant to  investigate job satisfaction  because of its allegedly highly 
subjective nature and also because personal judgements of satisfaction and 
other subjective opinions were considered as a research field more 
appropriate to other social scientists. However, in the late 1970’s a number of 
economists started to realize the significance of job satisfaction as an 
economic variable. In particular, job satisfaction research was thought to be 
important for analysing and predicting labour turnover, labour productivity and 
also for its relation to the degree of unionism in the labour market.  
 Almost from the first systematic studies of job satisfaction by 
economists, the research potential of the notion of relative wages or income 
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was realized. The work of Hamermesh (1977) is considered to be the earliest 
article of its kind in the economics literature. The author utilizes a sample of 
American employees and estimates job satisfaction equations. Hamermesh's 
work focuses on occupational choice and  training, but his regression 
equations include the residual from a wage equation as an explanatory 
variable. That residual enters positively and significantly in a job satisfaction 
regression, which is the same as specifying that individual utility is affected by 
the difference of actual from expected income. The same reasoning is 
followed a few years later by Layard (1980) for whom well-being depends on 
income and status relative to expectations.  
 As the literature on job satisfaction started to proliferate, more authors 
found that the inclusion of relative wage in job satisfaction equations was 
fruitful. For instance, a study by Cappelli and Sherer (1988) concentrating on 
the airline industry employed the idea of an outside "market wage', calculated 
by averaging pay for specific occupations in other airlines. The results 
indicated that the market wage  was statistically significant and negative in 
one of the two equations reported for pay satisfaction. This sort of 
specification was quite close to a pure relative wage effect.  
 The paper by Clark and Oswald (1996) concentrated exclusively on 
testing the role of relative or comparison income  on job satisfaction. The 
authors used data from 5000 British workers in order to test the hypothesis 
that  utility depends on income relative to a comparison or reference level. 
The authors conclude that: 
 
“These results appear to offer statistical credence to the hypothesis that 
feelings of well-being depend on a reference or comparison level of income. 
 15 
By contrast, they provide little support for the simple view, presented in 
microeconomics textbooks, that a worker's level of well-being is a function of 
absolute income.” (Clark and Oswald,1996, p.373) 
 
In the last few years research on job satisfaction which incorporates the 
notion of comparison income is abundant. There are many papers which have 
tried to test the hypothesis using various datasets (see for instance 
Drakopoulos and Theodossiou, 1997; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005 and references 
therein).  
Similarly to the case of job satisfaction, for many years economists 
were not interested in  concepts like well-being and happiness for the same 
reasons that they ignored the study of job satisfaction. Research on 
happiness and its relation to economic variables was conducted by a few 
social scientists. The exception was the pioneering work of R. Easterlin in 
1974 which dealt with the relation between income and happiness. Gradually 
though and especially in the last decade, the interest of economists on 
happiness has increased dramatically. The main reason for that was the 
realization that in the final analysis the purpose of economic growth was the 
presumed overall increase in happiness levels. Additional reasons that helped 
the promotion of happiness research was the realization that government 
intervention can help increase overall happiness by reducing unemployment 
and inequality levels (see also Layard, 2005). Thus as one would expect, the 
focus of happiness research by economists was  the study of the relationship 
between income and happiness.  
There have been many empirical studies which examine this 
relationship in many countries using a variety of micro and macro data. A 
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fairly common empirical result is that substantial increases in real per capita 
income do not correspond to equivalent increases of individual happiness. 
More strangely, there are examples where a negative correlation between real 
income and happiness were observed (see for instance, Easterlin, 1974, 
1995; Oswald, 1997; Wright 2000; Lane, 2000; Blanchflower and Oswald, 
2004). As one would expect, these empirical findings have puzzled many 
economists and some have called it the “paradox of happiness” or the 
“Easterlin paradox”(e.g. Phelps, 2001; Bruni and Porta, 2007).  
In attempting to explain the happiness paradox, economists have 
suggested a number of theoretical reasons such as social capital depreciation, 
level of inequality, changing aspirations etc. A large body of literature employs 
the idea of relative income or relative consumption hypothesis as an 
appropriate  approach towards tackling the paradox of happiness. The main 
thrust of the relative income argument  in the context of happiness research is 
that individuals do not extract much happiness from  their absolute income but 
from  their position relative to other people’s incomes. Thus, raising 
everybody’s income does not increase general happiness. This is because in 
comparison to others, income has not improved. (Frank, 1985, 1997: Andrews, 
1991; Veenhoven, 1991; Kenny, 1999; Easterlin, 1974, 2001; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005).  
The notion of relative income as a possible way of explaining the 
paradox was first suggested by Easterlin (1974). The same author uses it in a 
later paper in which he elaborates on the idea of aspirations in relation to 
income. A basic part of his argument is the concept of interdependent  
individual utilities  (Easterlin, 2001). Before the boom in the happiness 
 17 
literature, there were a few papers where happiness levels were linked to the 
notion of relative income or more generally interdependent utilities. In a 
relatively early paper, Tomes (1986) utilizes social-psychological measures of 
happiness and satisfaction in order to test the presence of interdependent 
preferences. The author uses Canadian survey data to test this hypothesis and 
the  empirical results support the interdependent preferences model.  
On individual happiness, McBride (2001) presents an empirical 
analysis to test for the effect of an individual's own income, past financial 
situation, and cohort (reference) income on subjective well-being. McBride 
(2001) finds, that  the higher the income of the peers, the less satisfied is the 
individual. There are numerous empirical studies on the aggregate level. A 
recent study by Blanchflower, and Oswald (2004) investigates happiness in 
the United States and Great Britain. Apart from confirming the existence of the 
happiness paradox for US and UK, the authors find that people care  about 
relative income. They also find indications that income is still important for 
lower income groups. Finally, a survey of empirical research on happiness 
and income  shows a clear connection between comparing rewards and 
happiness levels. As Frey and Stutzer write “It is not the absolute level of 
income that matters most but rather one’s position relative to other 
individuals” (Frey and Stutzer, 2002b, p.411, see also Layard, 2005). 
 
 
V. Main Economic Implications of Comparing Rewards 
 
 
The incorporation of relative income or more generally the existence of 
interdependent individual utilities, has serious implications for many standard 
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results in economics. In this section we concentrate on the issues of wage 
rigidity and unemployment, economic growth and inequality and tax policy.  
First of all and in more general terms, a number of theorists have 
indicated that  basic results concerning free-market efficiency might be 
problematic. For instance, in an early paper incorporating  interdependent 
preferences Pollak (1976)  studied  the long run per capital consumption 
patterns and demand functions. The author demonstrates that  “with 
interdependent preferences we cannot base judgements about individual 
welfare and the preference ordering revealed by market behaviour” (Pollak, 
1976, p.320). Many years later, Clark and Oswald (1996) argue in similar 
terms that  because preferences are intrinsically interdependent, the standard 
optimality results of the free market may fail to hold. Furthermore, the 
standard approach to individual demand functions based on Samuelsons’ 
revealed preference theory seems problematic if we take into account 
interdependent utilities and the recent literature on subjective well-being. More 
specifically, the lack of measurability implies that statements of individual 
welfare based on the revealed preference approach to utility are difficult to be 
put to test. On the other hand, if utility is understood as subjective well-being, 
the available data discredit the standard theory and fully support the 
interdependent utilities (e.g. Duesenberry’s) approach (for an extensive 
discussion see Holländer, 2001). 
One of the first specific consequences  that come to mind when  
adopting the notion of reward comparisons and especially of  relative wage is 
the Keynesian idea of wage rigidity and equilibrium unemployment. As was 
seen, the Keynesian idea of relative wages was forgotten by many 
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macroeconomists until the  1980’s. However, a number of contemporary 
influential macroeconomic theorists such as and Akerlof (1980) and Summers 
(1988) have re-employed this notion in more sophisticated theoretical 
frameworks in order to show the connection between relative wages, wage 
rigidity and equilibrium unemployment. Similar results are obtained in the 
intra-firm level: the wages offered by firms may have low variance if there are 
intra-firm comparison effects. Furthermore, employers are more likely to offer 
contracts guaranteeing no income reductions thus generating institutionalised 
downward wage rigidity. This wage rigidity at the level of firms produces 
Keynesian business cycles at the macro level (Mc Donald, 2002 and for 
empirical evidence for the non-existence of wage reductions see Teulings and 
Hartog (1997).  Oswald (1986) arrives at the same conclusions in labour 
economics by using a union utility function which incorporates relative wages. 
Starting from the perspective of behavioural economics, Baxter  (1988) also 
links the notion of reward comparisons to downward wage rigidity. 
One other serious consequence of  the idea of comparing rewards is 
that  the case for economic growth especially in developed countries is less 
strong. This conclusion is reached through two distinct strands of literature. In 
particular, from a macroeconomic point of view, the existence of 
interdependent utility functions might imply that economic growth is less 
important than income redistribution from wealthy to less wealthy citizens (see 
Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Kapteyn and Van Herwaarden, 1980). The 
same conclusion is reached in the context of income and happiness literature. 
The explanation of the happiness paradox by means of relative income 
implies that a general increase in absolute income has little effect on 
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happiness levels given that individuals care about their relative position. This 
is backed by empirical and theoretical arguments that economic growth in 
developed countries does not lead to greater happiness (Easterlin, 1974; 
Lane, 2001). In the same framework, the case for a more equal income 
distribution is also strong. For instance, if we accept that there is a national 
norm for a reference income then a more equal income distribution will 
increase happiness levels in a country (Clark, Frijters and Shields, 2007, 
p.38). This is also reinforced by empirical studies of the negative effect of 
inequality on happiness of a country  (Alesina, Di Tella and Mac Culloch, 
2004). 
The adoption of the concept of comparing rewards has also serious 
implications for optimal taxation theory. The main idea here is that the 
presence of income or consumption comparisons results to a negative 
externality which undermines standard optimal tax theory. In general terms, if   
consumption decisions are influenced by others’ consumption, consumption 
causes a negative externality by reducing the welfare of other individuals 
(Layard, 1980; Frank, 1985). In the specific case of an asymmetric structure 
of externalities as the one suggested by Duesenberry, this implies that 
wealthier individuals impose a negative external effect on poorer individuals 
but not vice versa. Furthermore, progressive income tax may well improve 
efficiency under Duesenberry’s assumptions rather than to impair it as 
deduced in standard welfare economics (see Holländer, 2001). In the case of 
income, the presence of income comparisons imply negative externalities 
from high income earners (Oswald, 1983). Following this argument in a 
specific example for educational subsidies,  Lommerud (1989) suggests that 
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some of the differences from labour income should be taxed in order to use 
educational subsidies to restore peoples’s incentives to undertake education. 
Thus, it is clear that the there are  theoretical justifications for altering the 
standard results of income and consumption taxation. 
Apart from the above, there are other studies examining the impact of 
income comparisons and interdependent utilities to more specific economic 
issues. For instance, the presence of relative concerns implies that poverty 
lines should be based on relative rather than absolute consumption as has 
been suggested by Sen (1983) and many others. The application of the idea 
to voting behaviour models means that individuals favouring the same policy 
or candidate are members of a common reference group, and the voting 
decision is determined by inter- and intra-group relations (Schram and 
Sonnemans, 1996). Finally, the incorporation of relative income in migration 
theories enhances our understanding of related phenomena as for instance 
why the elites in poor countries do not emigrate (Stark and Taylor, 1991). 
Thus, the concept of reward comparisons seems to be quite helpful in 
extending our understanding of a wide range of economic phenomena.  
 
 
VI. Concluding Comments 
  
The idea that people compare rewards has long been used by many 
social scientists and it has also provided the basis for interesting approaches 
to many social phenomena. In spite of its long presence in economics 
especially in the works of Veblen, Keynes and Duesenberry, the idea was 
relatively ignored by economists until effectively the 1980’s  with  a few 
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exceptions mainly by non-mainstream economists like Leibenstein and 
Easterlin.  The concept however, has started to draw the attention of an 
increasing number of economists in the last two decades. The empirical 
indications of its validity and the gradual realization that it can provide new 
insights to many economic issues were the main reasons for this relative 
revival. Moreover, the refreshing perspective that the new research area of 
subjective well-being (job satisfaction and happiness) seems to have given a 
push to the weak interest previously found in a few macro and labour 
economics papers. 
In spite of the above, the concept  with its specific expression in 
economics of comparison income or interdependent utilities, is still not 
accepted by the economics orthodoxy. Many economists believe for instance, 
the utility is based on absolute income only. Our discussion indicated that this 
might be due to two main reasons. First, many orthodox theorists regard 
empirical findings based on subjective well-being with mistrust, believing that 
they are not of high scientific value, a stance not shared however, by other 
social scientists. The second reason, and to our view, the more important one 
is that the full incorporation of comparison or relative income in economic 
theory would cast serious doubts in many well-established and important 
results. More specifically, the free-market efficiency results both at the micro 
and at the macro level might not hold. In addition, optimal taxation, economic 
growth and income distribution theories might need serious rethinking towards 
more progressive taxation and more emphasis on more equal income 
distribution. The important point concerning the incorporation of relative 
considerations is that their implications are often confirmed via different 
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research approaches. For instance, similar conclusions regarding the issue of 
growth over inequality are reached in  macroeconomics papers and also in 
the aggregate happiness papers which employ relative income concerns . 
Thus, in spite of its wide usage in other social sciences, its empirical 
significance (coming from a number of research approaches) and its theoretic 
enhancing dimensions, the idea of comparing rewards is still not widely 
accepted. Given its implications for many crucial economic results and their 
policy extensions, one might wonder about the relevance of the old issue of 
the influence of  value judgements on economic theory. However, more 
extensive research is required in order to provide a plausible explanation of 
the resistance to fully incorporate reward comparisons in orthodox economic 
theory.  
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